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I. INTRODUCTION
The billboard states: “Divorce: Men Only.”1 The website more
specifically targets a particular class of men: “[the firm] appreciates the
hard work performed by all law enforcement officers and firemen in
keeping our communities safe. As such, we offer discounts for these
individuals.”2 The website states that the law firm believes in “fighting for
men’s rights.”3
The reaction is one of confusion. Something just does not seem right.
Isn’t this discrimination? What if the billboard stated, “Divorce: Whites
only”? Does this message violate ethical rules? The message appears to
reach out to men who are about to face, or are already going through, a
divorce; men that have income, assets and benefits they need to protect.4 Is
the system willing to allow this apparent gender discrimination to continue
because the need to protect men’s rights in divorce outweighs the systemic
and societal harms associated with the message? This message, should, at
least, trigger further inquiry.
A little more internet browsing reveals that there are actually several
firms that seek to represent only one gender in family matters.5 Some
1. Fla. ‘Men’s Rights’ Law Firm Fights for Dads in Divorces, CHANNEL 8
WfLA.COM (Mar. 6, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.wfla.com/story/24908527/fla-mensrights-law-firm-fights-for-dads-in- divorces (last visited Dec. 24, 2014) [hereinafter
‘Men’s Rights’ Firm Fights].
2. FAQs, Cordell & Cordell, http://cordellcordell.com/about/frequently-askedquestions/#faq-7 (last visited May 10, 2015) (emphasis added).
3. Firm
Profile,
Kenny
Leigh
&
Assocs.
http://www.menonlyfamilylawonly.com/bocaraton/firm-profile/ (last visited Jun. 20,
2014).
4. About
Attorney
Johnny
D.
Drizis,
DIVORCE
FOR
MEN,
http://www.divorceformen.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
5. Firm
FAQs,
CHARLES
R,.
HOFHEIMER,
PC,
http://www.divorceandcustody4women.com/firmfaqs.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2015);
MILTON FAMILY LAW, http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2015); A BETTER ATTORNEY FOR WOMEN, http://www.attorneyforwomen.net/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015); DADS DIVORCE, http://www.dadsdivorce.com/ (last visited Jan.
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firms, as seen on the “men only” billboard, explicitly and intentionally
exclude an entire class of clients from the availability of their services.6
Other firms are more subtle. These firms implicitly indicate that only one
gender is welcome to seek their services.7 Firm names, such as Divorce for
Men8 and The Women’s Law Group9, deliver the message. Some firms
simply boast a cause: One firm is “dedicated to addressing gender bias
against men”10 while another is “designed to exclusively meet the needs of
women.”11
Further investigation reveals that the issue of gender bias in client
selection has received little attention since the late 1990’s when the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination found a female
attorney liable for her discriminatory practice of refusing to represent men
in domestic relations matters.12 This decision sparked scholarly discussion
examining the rights of clients and attorneys in the client selection process
and the publication of practice pointers for avoiding discrimination
claims.13 Over the past decade however, as the discussion receded, gender
based firms appear to have gone unchallenged.
Although this article focuses on the ethical issues associated with firms
that exclude women from its domestic relations services, the existence of
women-only law firms is acknowledged. The analysis of the ethical issues
raised by these gender specific firms is somewhat the same regardless of
20, 2015); KENNY LEIGH & ASSOCS., http://www.menonlyfamilylawonly.com/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015); MEN’S DIVORCE LAW FIRM, http://www.mensdivorcelaw.com/
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015); DIVORCE FOR MEN, http://www.divorceformen.org (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015).
6. Firm Profile, supra note 2; THE FIRM FOR MEN, www.thefirmformen.com (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015).
7. THE WOMEN’S LAW GROUP, http://www.thewomenslawgroup.com/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2015) (“We practice law from a woman’s perspective.”); BLOCH &
CHAPLEAU, LLC, http://www.blochchapleau.com/mens-rights-in-divorce (last visited
Feb. 5, 2015) (“Emphasizing the representation of men in Family law and Divorce
matters.”).
8. THE FIRM FOR MEN, supra note 6.
9. THE WOMEN’S LAW GROUP, supra note 7.
10. DIVORCE FOR MEN, supra note 4.
11. MILTON FAMILY LAW, supra note 5.
12. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No. 91-BPA-0061,1999 WL 33453078, at * 2
(M.C.A.D.1999), aff’d 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass. Super. 2003).
13. See Samuel Stonefield, Lawyer Discrimination Against Clients: Outright
Rejection—No; Limitations on Issues and Arguments—Yes, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
103, 109 (1998); see also Terri R. Day & Scott L. Rogers, When Principled
Representation Tests Antidiscrimination Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 33 (1998);
see also Steven Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer’s Choice of Clients: The
Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
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what gender is excluded.14 Because the exclusion occurs before any
contact with a particular client, few ethical or legal rules even apply.15 In
addition, there is no client, or even potential client, to complain about the
message.16 The analysis should not end there. It should extend to the
broad legal and moral principles that govern an attorney’s ethical
obligations.17
The exclusion of women raises specific concerns regarding the balance
of ethical rules and principles. For example, the message infers that men,
as a class, need special consideration to protect their rights in divorce
actions and that this can only be accomplished by firms that exclusively
represent men. The inference is that men are being treated unfairly in the
system and that a fight may be needed to accomplish a just result.18 Further
analysis is necessary here to test this inference; to the extent the inference
of a danger of an unjust result exists, further analysis is necessary to opine
whether the danger justifies the harm caused by the systemic acquiescence
to disparate treatment of women. Offering services only to men may
actually perpetuate stereotypical gender differences and preconceived fears
and misconceptions about the divorce process.
This article begins with a discussion of moral and ethical rules and
principles that guide an analysis of the propriety of a gender specific client
selection process.19 This includes a discussion of the theory underlying the
differing views of attorney autonomy and identity and clarifies the moral
considerations inherent in the client selection process.20 When ethical rules
and principles are considered along extrinsic legal rules, such as those
stemming from freedom of speech considerations and state antidiscrimination laws, this article exposes the gap that allows the practice to
avoid challenge.21 At this point, the analysis narrows from a discussion of
gender specific client selection to the specific ethical concerns associated
with firms that exclude women from the client selection pool and whether
the need to service only men is justified under principles of fairness and
justice.22 Finally, after suggesting that a need to protect men’s rights in
divorce should not justify a systemic acquiescence to the exclusion of all
women from the potential client pool, this article advocates for systemic
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
Firm Profile, supra note 2
See discussion infra Parts II.A–B.
See discussion infra Parts II.A.1–3.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
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action by the legal profession challenging the discriminatory practice of
exclusion of all women as potential clients solely because of gender in
order to protect the integrity of the profession and the legal system.23
II. MORAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
CLIENT SELECTION PROCESS
Is a pre-emptive exclusion of an entire gender, approximately half of the
population in the United States,24 from an attorney’s client selection base
ethical? Finding the answer requires an analysis of ethical, moral and legal
considerations. Although one Massachusetts court held that such a
practice was unlawful discrimination and a violation of the state antidiscrimination statute,25 the disparate treatment evades ethical challenge.
The client selection process usually begins with an intake or client
interview.26 In this face- to- face meeting both the client and the attorney
determine whether establishing an attorney-client relationship is
appropriate;27 time constraints, the attorney’s professional experience, and
the existence of potential conflicts need to be considered when making this
determination.28 It is during this meeting that the attorney obtains a
preliminary understanding of the issues involved and the client’s
objectives. The attorney also assesses whether she can assist the potential
client in achieving these goals.29 At the very least, the attorney must
determine if the client has a legally recognizable claim and is entitled to
relief.30 If as a result of the intake, the attorney believes that representing
the client will involve a legal or ethical wrong, or that the representation
will create a conflict with current or future clients, the attorney is free, or
required, to decline the case and the decision to do so will be supported by

23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUB. NO.

C2010BR-03, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, 2, (May 2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
25. See Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).
26. See DONALD G. TYE, ET AL., TRYING DIVORCE CASES IN MASSACHUSETTS §
1.3 (3d ed. 2013).
27. Id.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. (2015), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rul
es_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_16_declining_or_terminating_representation/comm
ent_on_rule_1_16_declining_or_t erminating_representation.html.
29. See TYE, supra note 26, at § 1.3.
30. W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics:
The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987, 1029 (2006).
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the bar.31 Other than declining representation because the client does not
present a legally cognizable interest or because representation will involve
a legal or ethical wrong, the appropriate degree of autonomy the attorney
enjoys in the client selection process has been the subject of great debate
among ethical scholars.32
Here, however, a pre-intake client selection issue, one in which an entire
class of individuals never make it in the door, is involved. In these
situations, the specific ethical rules provide little explicit guidance. The
analysis requires a broader analysis of a lawyer’s overall moral and ethical
responsibilities. First, understanding a lawyer’s obligations in the preclient selection stage requires a discussion of the extent to which an
attorney’s own morals should drive the decision making process. It is
traditionally thought that an attorney can decline to represent the client for
almost any reason.33 Whether an attorney should decline to represent a
client if, as a result of the intake, the attorney believes that the
representation will create a conflict with the attorney’s own beliefs, is at the
center of the debate. Next, a review of the ethical rules that directly
address the issue reveals the need to apply broad ethical principles that
provide the foundation for specific ethical rules. Finally, examining the
legal issues triggered by the decision to opt in or out of representation
provides a glimpse into why, despite an explicit discriminatory action, the
practice has been allowed to continue.
A. Moral Principles and Client Selection
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct acknowledge the absence of
clear guidance to assist in the determination of whether the attorney should
not “opt‒in”34 to an attorney–client relationship. The model rules suggest
that lawyers should be guided by moral principles.35 The questions of what
moral principles should guide an attorney and to what extent they should be
applied is the subject of intense legal, ethical, sociological, and

31. Id. at 1023, 1029.
32. Cf. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A

Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 634 (1986); see also
Wendel, supra note 30, at 987.
33. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2, 573 (1986).
34. A Re-Examination of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Pertaining
to Client Development in Light of Emerging Technologies , A.B.A.,,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionali
sm/professionalis m_ethics_in_lawyer_advertising/ethicswhitepaper.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Re-Examination of the Model Rules].
35. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble (2013).
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philosophical debate.36 Extensive literature exists on this issue,37 and a
resolution, if possible, is beyond the scope of this article.
An
understanding of the theoretical paradigms and concerns associated with
attorney autonomy, however, is necessary when analyzing client selection
issues.
The silence on the client selection process in the ethical rules can be
interpreted to support an intention to give great autonomy to attorneys in
the client selection process. Those who believe that attorneys should be
guided by their own personal morals, or “first-order moral reasons”38
advocate for autonomy in the client selection process.39 The autonomy
allows the attorney to choose clients with whom there is a shared identity.40
Some, however, see the fact that only a few rules relate to the client
selection process as indicating intent to support an inclusive client selection
process thus furthering an attorney’s obligations to serve those in need.41
Those who believe that attorneys should be guided by a systemic approach,
or “second order reasons,”42 adopt the morals of the profession rather than
individual morals or desires for identity.
There is inevitably some overlap in an attorney’s professional role and
his or her own personal morals, with most attorneys making decisions
based on the extent to which they are able to separate the two roles.
Attorneys, either subconsciously or altruistically,43 personally identify with

36. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2003).
37. See generally Monroe Freedman: Professor Law and former Dean at Hofstra
Law School; lectured at Harvard for 30 years and was a visiting professor at
Georgetown Law School from 2007-2012; received the American Bar Association’s
highest award for professionalism in recognition of a lifetime of original and influential
scholarship in the field of lawyers’ ethics; published Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary
System (1975) and Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics (4th ed., 2010). Professor Michael
Tigar: Research Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law;
visiting professor at Duke Law School from 2006-2008; former professor at University
of Texas; represented controversial clients including: Terry Nichols in the Oklahoma
City bombing case and Angela Davis.
38. Wendel, supra note 30 at 992.
39. See Terri R. Day & Scott L. Rogers, When Principled Representation Tests
Antidiscrimination Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 109 (1998); Stonefield, supra
note 13, at 122; see also W. William Hodes, Accepting and Rejecting Clients-The
Moral Autonomy of the Second-To-The-Last Lawyer in Town, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 977,
982 (2000).
40. Hodes, supra note 39, at 982.
41. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 19.
42. Wendel, supra note 30, at 992.
43. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 12-13.
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their clients on some level.44 A lawyer may identify with the client’s
personal attributes, such as their race or gender.45 Positional identification
refers to attorneys who identify with the client’s “cause”: “[s]he may
identify with the field of law in which the issues are regularly presented, or
with the constellation of moral, political, economic, or social interests that
underlie the client’s position and motivate her to seek representation. . . .”46
The level of identification desired influences the client selection process.
At its broadest and most extreme level, the discussion centers on the
difference between the view that attorneys should enjoy absolute autonomy
and complete discretion in the client selection process and those that
believe attorneys should have very little choice when selecting clients.47
Each view is supported by more specific theoretical and philosophical
concerns and each is subject to criticism because of those concerns.
Because the views are at each end extreme, there is room for a middle
ground.
1. The “Last Lawyer in Town” theory
The view that an attorney should have absolute discretion over client
selection is supported by “[t]he special nature of the attorney-client
relationship, the need for the attorney to ‘identify’ with the client, and the
demands of the personal relationship with the client.”48 Advocates of this
view believe that this decision should not be in the hands of legislators or
outsiders who do not understand the need for “empathy, loyalty, trust, and
acceptance between the lawyer and the client.”49
Those who believe in complete, or near complete autonomy, believe that
attorneys should be guided by their own personal moral beliefs, or “first
order reasons”50 and should be allowed to refuse to represent any client
who seeks her services as long as other counsel is available.51 This is the

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 19-22; Robert T. Begg, The Lawyer’s License to
Discriminate Revoked: How a Dentist Put Teeth in New York’s Anti-Discrimination
Disciplinary Rule, 64 ALB.. L. REV. 153, 204-205 (2000) [hereinafter Lawyer’s License
to Discriminate Revoked].
48. James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO J. LEGAL
ETHICS 59, 102 (2006).
49. Id. at 104.
50. See Hassan El Meny awi, Same Sex Marriage in Islamic Law, 2 WAKE FOREST
J. L. & POL’Y 375, 427-428 (2012); Wendel, supra note 30, at 1016.
51. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 29.
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“last lawyer in town” view.52 Advocates of this view see it as being
supported by existing law and opine that absent court appointment, “it is
well settled that lawyers do not have a legally enforceable obligation to
serve any particular client.”53
This view provides attorneys the choice to “opt out”54 of representation
when the attorney’s own moral or “practical identity”55 conflicts with the
individual or the issues involved.56 Because the normative is “clientcentered”57 representation this option is necessary to prevent “role
fracturing.”58 Without this option, lawyers would need to sever their own
personal self from their professional role.59 The danger is that this role
fracture may lead to attorneys becoming “moral prostitutes.”60 “Lawyers
are turned into liars, aggressors, friends of rapists and murderers, and all
sorts of other practical identities under which no one would choose to value
herself.”61
Under this view, attorneys are free to only “opt-in”62 to cases in which he
or she identifies with the personal or positional identity of the client,63 thus
serving the attorney’s own personal identity and cause while accomplishing
the client’s goals.64 At its most extreme, intense identification is defined to
be “thick.”65
Thick identity not only defines the attorney‒client
relationship, but it also defines how third parties or outside observers view
the relationship. Here the identities are viewed as being the same.66 At
first glance, this thick identity appears more consistent with a “client
centered” model of representation.67 It also appears to be more palatable
than forcing the fracturing of personal and professional identities that is
feared when attorneys are forced to advocate for persons who present
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Wendel, supra note 30, at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 1001 (citing Christine Korsgaard, The Authority of Reflection, in THE
SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 90, 93 (Onora O’Neil ed., 1996)).
56. Wendel, supra note 30, at 994.
57. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 8.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Wendel, supra note 30, at 1000.
60. Id. at 1001.
61. Id. at 1002.
62. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 28.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id. at 18.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 8-9.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

9

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1

496

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:4

causes that would violate their own morals and beliefs.68
On closer examination, however, using congruence of identity as criteria
for client selection can invoke systemic harm; most importantly, negatively
impacting the client’s ability to achieve a justiciable result. Attorneys are
more likely to violate the ethical rules by losing focus of, or even
exceeding the client’s goals, by “doing too much.”69 This approach can
provide a conduit for an attorney to act in his or her own self-interest under
the guise of “client centered” representation: “When identification is
intense . . . the boundaries between the subject and object of identification
can break down and it is all too easy for a lawyer to assume a non-existent
congruence of interest . . . . At the extreme, the client may actually
disappear or become a mere abstraction of the lawyer’s interests . . . .”70
The attorney who enters the legal profession with the well-intentioned goal
of furthering legal rights of a specific class may exemplify this danger.71
The desire for congruence can lead to incorrect assumptions regarding the
client’s role or position.72 These assumptions can be assigned early on thus
impacting the client selection decision73 and can affect the decisions made
during the representation.74 Until the lack of congruence is discovered,
client centered representation is not possible.
The congruence upon which a “thick” attorney-client relationship is
based cannot be assumed to remain intact throughout the representation.
Clients, with the advice of counsel, set the objectives of the representation
and attorneys are responsible to assist the client to reevaluate these goals
during the representation.75 This obligation is satisfied as long as the
interest of the client and attorney remain the same. At some point,
however, the once shared interest can separate; an occurrence that may go
unrecognized by the self‒interested attorney.76 Attorneys selecting clients
based upon gender risk finding themselves at odds with their clients when
the client’s objectives shift away from those the attorney has assigned
based on stereotypical traits associated with that class.77 The attorney is
unable to render independent professional advice which is essential in the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Lawyer’s License to Discriminate Revoked, supra note 47, at 183.
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 26.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 26-29.
Id.
Id.
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 26-29.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 (2013).
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 23.
Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No. 91-BPA-0061, 1999 WL 33453078, at *
1(M.C.A.D.1999), aff’’d 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept.16, 2003).
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attorney‒client relationship: “Thick identity deprives a lawyer of the
professional independence so essential to perceiving a client’s interest
dispassionately and to rendering sound, disinterested advice.”78
When the lack of actual congruence is discovered, the “role- fracturing”
of personal and professional identity that advocates of autonomy in the
client selection process seek to avoid can occur.79 This is particularly
harmful to the client because the separation of identities occurs after the
attorney-client relationship is created, when the client is contractually and
emotionally invested in attaining the goals expressed during the client
selection process, and when the attorney’s opportunities to “opt out” are
limited.80
“Thick” identity may also have a negative effect on the administration of
justice and public interest.81 These lawyers may “minimize” or “disregard”
their obligations to third parties thus contributing to systemic dysfunction
and decreased public confidence in the judicial system.82 The more an
attorney only serve clients with a particular trait or cause, the more the
attorney is identified to the public as an attorney who only serves those
types of clients or only takes those types of cases.83 Through both the
lawyer’s own client selection process and the attorney’s reputation within
the community, “thick identity significantly narrows the universe of clients
the lawyer is open to serve.”84 This is particularly concerning in a system
in which diversity among attorneys still does not reflect diversity of the
entire potential client pool.85 Even when the desired identity is based on a
trait or cause well represented in the legal community, concerns regarding
the inability for lawyers to maintain “professional independence”86 and the
dangers associated with more specialization in the legal community87
remain.
2. The “Cab Rank Rule” theory
Those who believe that attorneys should have little discretion in the
client selection process, at its most extreme end mimicking the British “cab

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Spaulding, supra note 36, at 26.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 26.
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Wendel, supra note 30, at 1009.
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rank rule,”88 believe that lawyers should be guided less by their own
personal morals and more by a systemic approach, or “second order
reasons.”89 Here the morals involved are those associated with the legal
profession and not the attorney’s own personal morals.90 The level or
identification here is weak or “thin.”91
While there is no explicit requirement for an inclusive client selection
process, proponents find support in the basic underlying principles of the
ethical rules.92 The Model Rules explicitly provide for a separation of
client and attorney identity.93 Explaining the purpose of this separate
identity, the comments suggest that it is meant to foster an inclusive client
selection process and to discourage using the lack of a shared personal
identity or cause as a means to decline representation.94 An underlying
goal of an inclusive client selection process is to insulate attorneys from
public criticism associated with taking on unpopular clients or cases; the
attorney is simply carrying out a requirement of the profession.95 This
furthers access to justice for all regardless of how repugnant the person or
position.96 As seen above, critics of this view cite the dangers associated
with role fracturing that exists without thick identity. In response to those
who challenge a requirement that lawyers leave their own moral beliefs out
of the client selection decision, role differentiation is explained as being
part of the profession: “Becoming a lawyer means accepting the
constraints of the range of moral considerations that may be taken into
account in practical reasoning. It means participating in activities ‘that
honorable and scrupulous people might, prima facie at least, be disinclined
to do.’”97 The decision to represent the client should be based upon a
“service” principle and not identity. This “service norm” is based on “a
combination of dedication to competent service for existing clients and
ensuring that all prospective clients have access to legal services . . . .”98
This approach, in a less dramatic form, is similar to ideals underlying a
middle ground.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 994.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 988.
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 17.
See Spaulding, supra note 36, at 21.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 (2013).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2013).
Wendel, supra note 30, at 1000.
Id.
Id. at 991.
Spaulding, supra note 36, at 18-19.
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3. The Professional Ethical Rules Approach
In between both of the extremes, complete autonomy and a “cab rank
rule” system, exists reason. As the practice of law becomes more
specialized, attorneys need, to some degree, to consider client identity in
the client selection process. As one author reasons, “[p]oor people do not
need lawyers who specialize in asset‒backed securities deals, and
corporations do not need to hire divorce lawyers . . . .”99 Rejecting a
potential client, however, because of a lack of “enthusiasm” or passion for
the client or the cause should not be the norm. 100 Alternatively, declining
to represent a client is clearly warranted when the conflict between the
attorney’s own moral identity severely conflicts with the client’s personal
or positional identity rendering competent representation impossible.101
These decisions, however, are best made with a systemic approach,
utilizing the rules of the profession rather than the attorney’s own personal
moral beliefs.102 Even when the representation will challenge the
attorney’s own personal beliefs, the role of attorney demands the ability to
render independent professional judgment at all times, especially in the
most sensitive of situations.103 Acting in a professional capacity, lawyers
are expected to keep the clients goals in the forefront. As this same author
bluntly states, “[i]f [a lawyer] has a ground project that is of such
importance that it would be impossible to serve clients regardless of her
moral disagreements with them, then that person may wish to rethink her
decision to become a lawyer.”104
Public confidence in the system is best served when client selection
decisions are made in accordance with, and can be justified by, the rules of
the profession. The public expects attorneys to objectively engage as part
of a system premised upon equal access to justice.105 The public expects
client selection decisions to be based on the legal merits of a claim and not
on the identity of the actor or the attorney’s own morals.106 Although in
today’s legal community, rejecting a client will seldom have a direct
distributive effect,107 client selection decisions based upon the personal or
practical identity of potential clients, and systemic approval or silence or
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Wendel, supra note 30, at 1009.
Id. at 1010.
Id.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1010.
Wendel, supra note 30, at 1016.
Id.
See id. at 1026.
Id. at 997-98.
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inaction, can be interpreted as an endorsement of that particular trait or
cause. This discourages outliers from seeking to enforce an opposing
right.108
In some situations, the conflict of identities, personal or positional, is so
severe that it cannot be resolved even with the assistance of two decades of
discussion about the role an attorney’s identity should play in the client
selection process.109 The dilemma is understandable when it involves a
decision of whether to represent an accused Nazi death camp guard, 110 or
the decision of an African American attorney to represent a Ku Klux Klan
member.111 These are issues that implicate an extreme challenge to the
attorney’s moral identity, and even under the most inclusive client selection
model, should justify a decision to decline representation based on the
inability to render competent representation.112 In contrast, the identity
conflict associated with “Men Only” law firms does not trigger this
extreme situation. It does, however, lead to a discussion of whether the
personal or practical identity conflict justifies a determination that the
attorney cannot competently represent an entire class of individuals without
even the benefit of a client intake.113 The Professional Ethical Rules
approach is used to analyze this pre-intake client selection process, which
excludes those of a particular gender from the potential client pool.
B. Ethical Rules
A gray area exists for those searching the ethical rules to determine
whether the pre-client intake exclusion of an entire gender is permissible.
There is no rule that directly applies to the pre-client intake client selection
process necessitating a deeper examination of the ideals upon which the
rules are based. The analysis begins with the threshold requirements of
fitness and extends to specific rules including those governing professional
conduct and professional misconduct.
1. Threshold Requirement: Fitness to Practice Law and Good Moral
Character
A determination to exclude an entire gender from the client pool may
108. Spaulding, supra note 36, 12-13.
109. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74

TEX. L. REV. 111, 112 (1995) [hereinafter Lawyer’s Moral Obligation].
110. See id. at 114.
111. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and The First Amendment: Should a Black
Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1030 (1995).
112. See Lawyer’s Moral Obligation, supra note 109 at 117; see also id. at 1037-38.
113. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No. 91-BPA-0061, 1999 WL 33453078, at *1-3
(M.C.A.D.1999), aff’’d 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept.16, 2003).
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implicate fitness concerns. Every state requires a determination that an
individual is morally fit to practice law as part of the bar admission
process.114 “Good moral character”115 is the cornerstone of fitness to
practice law.116 Although there is no set definition of good moral character,
the existence of a criminal conviction or documented evidence of
dishonesty will easily trigger further investigation or inquiry.117
Determining good moral character without obvious triggering events is
limited by the term’s vagueness.118 In the context of attorney fitness to
practice law, the term has been defined by courts to include a dedication to
the overall administration of justice and fairness: a lack of good moral
character is indicated by “acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable
[person] to have substantial doubts about an individual’s honesty, fairness,
and respect for the rights of others, and for the laws of the state and
nation.”119 The obligation to display good moral character does not end
upon admission to the bar, as fitness to practice law continues as long as
the attorney is a member of the profession.120 When the test for good moral
character is applied to the practice of excluding an entire gender from the
client selection pool, the question of the ability to be fair and display
respect for others is implicated.
2. The Professional Conduct Requirements
Because of the lack of specific rules governing the client selection
process, a broad view of an attorney’s obligations under the professional
conduct rules is necessary. Few of the specific ethical rules apply before
an attorney-client relationship is established: “Most of the duties flowing
from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested
the lawyer render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.”121
114. Larry Craddock, “Good Moral Character” As a Licensing Standard, 28 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 449, 451 (2008).
115. See id. at 452 (stating “Black’s Law Dictionary defines the phrase good moral
character, in part, as [a] pattern of behavior that is consistent with the community’s
current ethical standards and that shows an absence of deceit or morally reprehensible
conduct . . . A pattern of behavior conforming to a profession’s ethical standards and
showing an absence of moral turpitude. Good moral character is usu[ally] a
requirement of persons applying to practice a profession such as law or medicine.”).
116. See id. at 451-52.
117. See id. at 451, 460 (maintaining that if an investigator finds information
contrary to the information provided on a licensing application, the investigator can ask
the applicant about the inconsistencies).
118. Id. at 451-53.
119. Id. at 452-53.
120. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.1 cmt. 1 (2013).
121. Confidentiality is one duty that exists even prior to the establishment of an
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Once an attorney–client relationship exists, the rules provide the
framework for resolving conflicts between the attorney’s obligation to
zealously work toward attaining the client’s objectives, “within the bounds
of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous, and civil attitude
toward all involved in the legal system.”122 Even the rules, which apply to
prospective clients, are not applicable to the exclusion of women from the
potential client pool because only those who actually consult with a lawyer
about the potential for representation are considered prospective clients.123
When no attorney-client relationship has yet been established, the
attorney’s obligations to the system and the community are at the
forefront.124 At this point, there is no conflict between the attorney’s
obligations to zealously represent her client and the public interest.125 Even
absent an attorney-client relationship, attorneys are trained and expected to
recognize when any ethical dilemma exists,126 including those situations
that would interfere with the overall obligation to seek justice. This ethical
obligation is both an explicit and implicit theme of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.127
a. Preamble
Lawyers must understand the importance of their role within the legal
system because, as stated in the Preamble to the model rules, “[l]awyers
play a vital role in the preservation of society.”128 The first paragraph of
the Preamble explicitly states that an attorney’s ethical obligations extend
beyond those associated with representing individual clients: “A lawyer, as
a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice.”129 Other provisions of the Preamble direct attorneys to

attorney-client relationship. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (2013); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013).
122. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble (2013).
123. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(a) (2013).
124. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble.
125. Id.
126. See Fischer, supra note 48, at 62.
127. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct were published in 1983. The Model Rules are used in this
discussion for a national rather than state specific approach. The Model Rules have
been adopted or have been the “model” for ethical rules in almost all states; see also
Day, supra note 39, at 27 n.9.
128. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble.
129. See id.
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act with respect toward the legal system130 to seek the administration of
justice,131 and to “further the public’s understanding of and confidence in
the rule of law and the justice system.”132
Difficulty in balancing personal needs and the responsibilities of the
profession is acknowledged: “In the nature of law practice . . .[v]irtually
all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and to the lawyer’s own
interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory
living.”133 While the rules provide the framework for resolving conflicts
between an attorney’s personal needs and professional responsibilities,
attorneys are expected to use their own personal and professional moral
judgment to resolve these dilemmas.134 Without the existence of duties to a
specific client, attorney self-interest must give way to public interest when
the conflict is between an attorney’s personal needs and the attorney’s
professional responsibility to seek justice.135 Although limited in number,
the few specific ethical rules that apply, absent the existence of an attorneyclient relationship, underscore the importance and depth of an attorney’s
obligation to the administration of justice.136
b. Specific Rule Governing Client Selection
The Model Rules provide little explicit regulation of attorney autonomy
in the client selection process. The rules do, however, provide protection
from criticism should an attorney choose to represent a client when the
client or the issues involved are controversial or repugnant.137 Model Rule
1.2(b) states that “a lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not
constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or
moral views or activities.”138 Based on the premise that all deserve access
to justice, this rule addresses attorney concerns about the personal impact
representing controversial or unpopular clients can have.139
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (stating that lawyers are essentially autonomous and are responsible for
following the profession’s regulations in order to further the public interest).
136. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (prosecutor’s responsibility);
id. R. 8.3 (reporting lawyer misconduct); id. R. 8.4 (types of misconduct).
137. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (“[R]epresenting a client does not constitute approval of
the client’s views or activities.”).
138. Id. at R. 1.2(b).
139. See id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 5
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Other specific rules governing client selection assume at least the
existence of a specific prospective client. An attorney must decline
representation if it would cause a concurrent conflict of interest.140 This
conflict of interest includes not only a conflict with the interest of other
clients but may also exist if there is a “significant risk” that the lawyer’s
own interest would interfere with the ability to carry out the objectives of
the representation.141
Model Rule 1.18 specifically addresses obligations to prospective
clients.142 The rule prohibits the representation of a client whose interests
are “materially adverse” to a prospective client.143 It is here that the term
“prospective client” is explained to mean one who actually has a
consultation with the attorney and would not include one who simply
responds to an advertisement without invitation to provide information.144
This definition appears to make this rule inapplicable to the exclusion of
women as potential clients before any contact is made.
Model Rule 1.16 provides the most specific guidance for the client
selection process.145 An attorney must decline representation when, “the
140. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2). (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if . . .
representation of one client [would or] will be directly adverse to another client; or . . .
there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”).
141. See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (noting that the rule also includes situations where there
is a substantial risk that the attorney’s other responsibilities will interfere with
accomplishing the prospective client’s objectives).
142. See generally id. at R. 1.18.
143. Id. at R. 1.18(c); See Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1165, 1191 (2006) (suggesting Rule 1.18 should be expanded to include a reminder that
an attorney, during the intake stage, should not accept representation unless he or she
can fulfill the duty of zealous advocacy).
144. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 2 (“For example, a consultation is
likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer’s advertising
in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a
potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and
cautionary statements that limit the lawyer’s obligations, and a person provides
information in response. . . . [I]n contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person
provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the
lawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides
legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information
unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to
discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a
‘prospective client.’ Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the
purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a ‘prospective client.’”).
145. See id. at R. 1.16 (rule regarding declining or terminating client
representation).
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representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or
other law.”146 Representation should not occur, “unless it can be performed
competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest, and to
completion.”147 Personal disagreement with a client’s goals is only
specifically mentioned as a reason to seek withdrawal from representation:
An attorney may withdraw if “the client insists upon taking action that the
lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement.”148
Firms that limit the client pool to men only avoid triggering these rules
by precluding any intake of women. Specific client interests, goals, or
beliefs are not ascertained. Using the purpose and basic premise of the
ethical rules and Model Rule 8.4 along with specific jurisdictional ethical
rules, this conduct may be, at a minimum, unethical.149
3. Professional Misconduct Rules
The definition of professional misconduct, depending on the jurisdiction,
either explicitly or implicitly includes discriminatory actions. Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 8.4 provides a list of acts that would be considered
professional misconduct.150 Specifically included in the list is “conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”151 While the model rule
does not explicitly prohibit discriminatory behavior as conduct that would
impede the administration of justice, the comments make this connection:
“A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status”
engages in professional misconduct “when such actions are prejudicial to
the administration of justice.”152
Although the rule and comment appear to apply to situations of gender
discrimination in client selection, two issues arise. First, although the rule
itself applies to all attorney conduct, the comment ties acts of bias to those
that occur in the “course of representing a client.”153 Secondly, the
requirement that the attorney knowingly acts in a prejudicial manner

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at R. 1.16(a)(1).
Id. at R. 1.16 cmt. 1.
See id. at R. 1.16(b)(4).
See id. at R.8.4; see also id. at R. 8.4 cmt. 3.
Id. at R. 8.4.
Id. at R. 8.4(d).
See id. at R. 8.4 cmt. 3.
See id.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

19

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1

506

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:4

implies a finding of unlawful discrimination by an appropriate tribunal.154
Through state adoption of this, or similarly amended rules, these issues are
dealt with in different ways: From specific to more general prohibitions
and from rules that apply to all attorney conduct, including the client
selection process, to those that specifically exclude the rule’s application to
the client selection process.155
a. Broad State Anti-Discrimination Misconduct Rules
Several states, either through adding onto the specific provisions
identifying discrimination as conduct that impedes the administration of
justice, or through comments clarifying the same, broadened the rule’s
scope by including within its reach any action performed in the attorney’s
professional role.156 These jurisdictions would likely apply the rule to the
pre-intake client selection process. Rather than limiting the rule’s
applicability to actions associated with the representation of a client, many
states apply the rule to actions done in “connection with the practice of
law.”157
For example, subsection (g) of the Indiana Professional
Misconduct Rule 8.4 prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct, in a
professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice
based on race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual
orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors.”158 New Jersey
has the same language in rule 8.4(g) and the comments clarify the intent of
the language: The addition of paragraph (g) “is intended to make
discriminatory conduct unethical when engaged in by lawyers in their
professional capacity. It . . . [covers] activities in the court house . . . as
well as . . . activities related to practice outside of the court house, whether
or not related to litigation, such as . . . activities in the lawyer’s office and
firm.”159
Florida ties the applicability of the rule to the fundamental ideals on
which the ethical rules are based. The comments to the Florida
professional misconduct rule160 explain that the rule applies to any activity
of an attorney connected with the practice of law. Discriminatory conduct
by an attorney “subverts the administration of justice and undermines the
154. See id.
155. See infra notes 155–173 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Ark. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2014); Fla. Rules of Prof’l

Conduct R. 4-8.4 cmt. subdivision (d) (2010); IND. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015);
Minn. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4 cmt. 5 (2015); N.J. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(g) (2015).
157. Ark. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4 cmt. 3; see also Ind. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(g).
158. Ind. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(g).
159. N.J. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(g), cmt. 3.
160. Fla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4-8.4(d).
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public’s confidence in [the] system of justice, as well as notions of
equality.”161
The Minnesota Rule for Professional Conduct ties discriminatory
conduct, whether done within or outside of the practice of law, to attorney
character and fitness requirements.162 While subsection (g) of the
Minnesota Rule for Profession Conduct 8.4 prohibits harassment on the
basis of sex in connection with a lawyer’s professional activities,
subsection (h) of rule 8.4 applies to unlawful discrimination “that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”163 The connection to
character and fitness reflects a concern about whether one who fails to
recognize the importance of equality to the concept of justice should be
part of the system: “A lawyer whose behavior demonstrates hostility
toward or indifference to the policy of equal justice under the law may
thereby manifest a lack of character required of members of the legal
profession.”164
The rules that include discrimination occurring in the course of
representing a client as misconduct will most likely not apply to the
exclusion of all women from the potential client pool, whereas those that
apply the misconduct rule to the “lawyer’s professional activities” or to the
activities carried on “in the practice of law” may well be broad enough to
include the client selection process. Some jurisdictions, however,
explicitly either include or exclude client selection from the activities
covered by the misconduct rule.165
b. Explicit Inclusion or Exclusion of the Client Selection Process
Both Texas and Washington explicitly exclude the client selection
process from the application of the state anti-discrimination misconduct
161. Fla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4-8.4 cmt. subdivision d.
162. Minn. Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4 cmt. 5 (2015).
163. See id. at R. 8.4(g); see also id. at R. 8.4(h) (“factors to consider when

deterring whether the discrimination affects the attorney fitness include: “(1) the
seriousness of the act, (2) whether the lawyer knew that the act was prohibited by
statute or ordinance, (3) whether the act was part of a pattern of prohibited conduct, and
(4) whether the act was committed in connection with the lawyer’s professional
activities. . . .”).
164. See id. at R. 8.4 cmt. 6.
165. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.08 (2015) (noting
that prohibited discriminatory practices do not apply when a lawyer is determining
whether to represent a client), and WASH. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015)
(stating that a lawyer is not limited by the prohibited discriminatory practices when
deciding to represent an individual), with N.J. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2015)
(implying that a lawyer cannot discriminate when choosing a client because a lawyer
cannot discriminate “in a professional capacity”).
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rule.166 Texas has a separate anti-discrimination conduct rule.167 Rule 5.08
(a) states that an attorney “in connection with an adjudicatory proceeding”
shall not “manifest, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on race,
color, national origin, religion, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation
towards any person involved in that proceeding in any capacity.”168 Even
though the language of the rule is to be broadly interpreted to include
conduct both inside of and outside of court proceedings,169 the rule
explicitly excludes the client selection process from its application: The
rule, “does not apply to a lawyer’s decision whether to represent a
particular person in connection with an adjudicatory proceeding . . . .”170
Although Washington broadly applies its antidiscrimination misconduct
rule to conduct within the lawyer’s professional activities, attorney
autonomy in the client selection process is preserved: “This rule shall not
limit the ability of a lawyer to accept [or] decline . . . representation of a
client in accordance with Rule 1.16.”171
While many anti-discrimination misconduct rules can be interpreted to
implicitly apply to the client selection process, at least one jurisdiction
explicitly prohibits unlawful discrimination in the client selection
process.172 California, like Texas, has a separate professional conduct rule
addressing discriminatory actions by an attorney.173 California, however,
takes the opposite position regarding client selection. Rule 2-400 states,
“[i]n the management or operation of a law practice, a [lawyer] shall not
unlawfully discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on
the basis of race[,] national origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or
disability in . . . accepting or terminating representation of any client.”174
This provision, like many others, requires the discrimination to be
unlawful.175 As a result, no disciplinary action can occur unless there is
first a determination of unlawful discrimination by an appropriate
tribunal.176 Thus, the issue remains whether the exclusion of women from
166. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.08; see also WASH. R. OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
167. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.08.
168. Id. at R. 5.08(a).
169. See id. at R. 5.08 cmt. 1.
170. Id. at R. 5.08.
171. See WASH. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
172. See CAL. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2–400(B)(2) (2013).
173. See id. at R. 2–400.
174. See id. at R. 2–400(B)(2); see also CAL. PROPOSED R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
8.4.1(b) (Proposed Oct. 2010).
175. See infra Part II.D.
176. See CAL. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2–400(C).
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the client section process is “unlawful.”177
C. Legal Implications
The timing of the discriminatory conduct, pre-client intake, may not only
shield attorneys from misconduct claims when excluding women from the
client selection pool, but it may also provide protection against legal
challenges. Two examples of this can be seen in freedom of speech
defenses to the application of attorney advertising rules and the
inapplicability of the state anti-discrimination statutes to the law office.
1. Attorney Freedom of Speech Considerations
Because the exclusion of women from the client pool is largely
accomplished through advertising, the intersection of ethical principles and
freedom of speech considerations deserves mention. While ethical rules
still prohibit in‒person solicitation,178 attorney advertising is allowed as
long as such advertising is not false, misleading, or potentially
misleading.179 With this caveat, advertising to the “general public” through
the use of a billboard or a website is allowed because it does not involve
the danger for abuse associated with in‒person or direct solicitation of
clients who may be “overwhelmed” with a legal crisis.180
Absent a finding that the message is unlawful or false, attorney
advertising is commercial speech that enjoys First Amendment
protection.181
When a state rule or regulation regarding attorney
advertising is challenged, the Supreme Court applies the Central Hudson
test to provide limited protection.182 The “Central Hudson test requires the
government to show (1) that a substantial governmental interest supports
the regulation, (2) that the regulation “directly and materially” advances the
interest and (3) that the regulation is “narrowly drawn” to “achieve the
desired result.”183 If the court finds the advertisement is false or unlawful,

177. See infra Part II.C.2.
178. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3(a) (2013).
179. See id. at R. 7.2-7.3; see also id. at R. 7.1 (stating “A lawyer shall not make a

false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A
communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact
or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not
materially misleading.”).
180. See id.at R. 7.3 cmt. 1, 2.
181. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) (applying the
Central Hudson test).
182. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ADDE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS
333 (4th ed. 2010) (referencing Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 622-23, 635).
183. See id.at 333 n.66 (stating “[A] fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
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the government automatically satisfies its burden.184
This test was used in Florida Bar v. Went for It to uphold Florida’s rule
prohibiting direct mail solicitation to victims or their families within thirty
days of an accident or injury.185 In finding that the state satisfied the first
prong of the test, the Court acknowledged that “[o]n various occasions we
have accepted the proposition that ‘States have a compelling interest in the
practice of professions within their boundaries, and . . . as part of their
power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they
have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions.”186 The direct mail solicitation
involved targeting a specific group of individuals and not the general
public.187 This fact also supported the Court’s finding that the government
also satisfied the second and third prongs of the Central Hudson test.
Under the second prong, the time limitation imposed on sending letters
targeting victims directly and materially advanced the state’s interest in
protecting the privacy interest of the injured victims at a time of grief or
distress.188 It also advanced the state’s interest in protecting the reputation
of the legal profession: “The purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail
ban is to forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal
profession that the practice of direct solicitation only days after accidents
has engendered.”189 Finally, in finding that the third prong of the test was
also satisfied, Justice Sandra Day O’Conner reasoned that the ban on
communicating with potential clients was sufficiently narrow in time and
scope and that less intrusive means to reach the injured were available.190
For example, attorneys could still advertise to the general public rather than
to a specific targeted group.191 The Court made a clear distinction between
the least restrictive means test required under strict scrutiny and that
required in commercial speech matters: “What our decisions require,”
instead, “is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends,’[sic] a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but
reasonable . . .”) (quoting Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 632).
184. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623-24.
185. See id.; See FREEDMAN, supra note 182, at 335.
186. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975)).
187. See id. (noting that direct-mail solicitations harmed the legal profession’s
reputation).
188. See id. at 625-26, 628.
189. See id. at 631.
190. See id. at 633-34.
191. See id.
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one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective.”192
The state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the bar includes
discouraging a stereotypical and unflattering view of the attorney’s role in
litigation. In one instance, an attorney’s advertisement that exploited the
need to have a combative attorney to get results was held to be unethical
and attorney misconduct.193 In Florida Bar v. Pape, a law firm’s
commercial depicted an image of a pitbull and used the term pitbull in the
firm telephone number.194 The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the
referee’s finding that the advertisement was commercially protected
speech.195
The Court found the advertisement to be inherently deceptive,
misleading, and manipulative.196 The Court noted the state’s interest in
preserving the integrity of the judicial system: “Indeed, permitting this
type of advertisement would make a mockery of our dedication to
promoting public trust and confidence in our system of justice. Prohibiting
advertisements such as the one in this case is one step we can take to
maintain the dignity of lawyers, as well as the integrity of, and public
confidence in, the legal system.”197
While the First Amendment provides some protection against claims that
attorney advertising targeting only men to the exclusion of all women is
unethical, the state’s heightened interest in regulating the practice of law
within its borders and its interest in maintaining the integrity of the legal
system remain Under the Central Hudson test, a state’s substantial interest
in protecting the integrity of the legal profession can justify regulation of
the “Men Only” advertisement even absent a finding of unlawful
discrimination or attorney misconduct.198 Banning this type of advertising
advances the state’s interest while leaving less restrictive means intact.
Attorney autonomy in the client selection process remains intact once a
particular client seeks the attorney’s services.199
In addition, no First Amendment protection exists, or at least the three

192. Id. at 632 (noting that the “least restrictive means” test is not used when
analyzing commercial speech).
193. See Florida Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 244 (Fla. 2005).
194. Id. (advertising phone number as 1-800-PITBULL).
195. Id.at 249-50.
196. Id. at 244.
197. Id. at 246-47.
198. See infra Part III.
199. See infra Part IV.
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part test of the second part of the Central Hudson test is not even
implicated, if the advertisement is unlawful.200 A finding that the “Men
Only” client selection process constitutes unlawful discrimination would
automatically preclude any First Amendment protection. With the
exception of one case,201 however, the lawfulness of the practice of
preemptively excluding an entire gender from the potential client pool has
remained unchallenged.
2. Applicability of State Anti-Discrimination Laws
Limiting the potential client selection pool to one gender avoids
challenge because, absent a finding of “unlawful” discrimination, attorney
conduct rules in most jurisdictions will not apply and freedom of speech
protections do apply.202 Unlawful discrimination exists if there is a finding
that the actions violated anti‒discrimination laws by the appropriate
tribunal.203 The reality is, however, that law firms escape the reach of the
anti‒discrimination laws because anti-discrimination statutes do not apply
unless the conduct occurs in a place of public accommodation.204 While a
complete discussion of the federal and state anti‒discrimination laws is
beyond the scope of this article, a brief discussion is necessary in order to
understand why the legality of “Men Only” law firms has basically gone
unchallenged. A discussion of one case in which the state antidiscrimination statute was found to apply to a law firm exemplifies the
reach of anti-discrimination statutes once this threshold hurdle is cleared.
a. The Law Office as a Place of Public Accommodation
The Americans With Disabilities Act is the only federal anti‒
discrimination statute that explicitly applies to law offices.205 The Act
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in “places of public
accommodation” and lists law firms as a place of public accommodation

200. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995).
201. See generally Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at

*1 (Mass. Sept. 16, 2003) (holding that a female attorney was unlawfully
discriminating against prospective male clients at her divorce practice; the court
ordered that she must stop her discriminatory practices).
202. See infra Part II.
203. See Begg, supra note 47, at 157-58.
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2009) (prohibiting discrimination of people with
disabilities in public accommodations only); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2009)
(noting that a law office is only a public place for the purpose of accommodations for
people with disabilities).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
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when defining the phrase.206 Many state statutes that prohibit gender
discrimination include that same “place of public accommodation”
prerequisite; however, unlike in the ADA, law firms are not explicitly
included in the definition.207 This absence of an explicit inclusion of law
firms as a place of public accommodation, or a broad definition of the
term,208 enhances a lawyer’s autonomy in the client selection process. The
law firm has traditionally been viewed as a place in which a distinctly
private professional relationship is established, thus eluding the reach of
anti-discrimination laws.209 The growing sentiment against discrimination
when providing services to the public, and using the ADA as support,
demonstrates that firms can be, and have been, included as places of public
accommodation under state anti‒discrimination laws.210 The inclusion of
law firms in this definition would trigger the applicability of state antidiscrimination statutes to “Men Only” law firms.
b. Finding Gender Specific Client Selection Unlawful Discrimination
A decision from the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
in 1999 sparked scholarly debate about the level of autonomy an attorney
should have in the client selection process.211 The case directly involved
discrimination against potential clients on the basis of gender.212 Although
the decision was based on a violation of the state anti-discrimination
statute, it also addressed issues relevant to a broader analysis.213 , The way
the claim arose highlights why the practice of excluding potential clients on
the basis of gender has gone relatively unchallenged. It is unlikely that
clients want to hire an attorney who clearly does not want to represent
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
207. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 2014) (listing all of the places that

do and do not fall into the public category; law offices are never mentioned);
Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Sept. 16, 2003) (comparing public places within the ADA with those in the legal
regulations); see also Begg, supra note 47, at 165 nn.53-54.
208. See, e.g., Begg, supra note 47, at 165 n.53 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West
1982 & Supp. 2000)).
209. Id. at 162-63.
210. See Nathanson, 2003 WL 22480688, at *3-4; see also Begg, supra note 47, at
170-71.
211. See generally Stropnicky v. Nathanson, No. 91-BPA-0061, 1999 WL
33453078, at *1 (M.C.A.D. 1999) (holding that a female lawyer was unlawfully
discriminating against prospective male clients), aff’d 2003 WL 22480688, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).
212. See id.
213. See id. at *3 (discussing the right to refuse to speak and the circumstances
when the government can require speech without violating the Constitution).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

27

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1

514

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:4

them.214 Here, however, a member of the excluded class, a male, actually
sought the legal services of an attorney who was known to accept only
women divorce clients.215
This case involved a female attorney who, in 1991, admittedly only
represented wives in her divorce practice.216 In support of this practice,
Nathanson argued a cause: the ongoing gender bias against women in the
system.217 In support of the cause, she cited a gender bias study indicating
that “women were disadvantaged relative to men in access to the judicial
system and treatment within that system.”218 She claimed that her personal
decision to become an attorney was based on a professional goal of
“helping to advance the status of women in the legal system.”219
Declining to represent this male, however, exposed a wrinkle in
Nathanson’s defense. Stropnicky, the male, was the homemaker and
primary caretaker of the children, and he maintained this role while his
wife finished medical school.220 The wife’s income far exceeded that of
Stropnicky. Stropnicky claimed his marital role was similar to that
typically held by females in divorce, specifically because his homemaker
and caretaker responsibilities contributed to his wife’s success.221
Nathonson, presumably operating under “thick” identity ideals,222 assumed
a generalized positional practice to only represent those with a specific
trait, here gender.223 Although the issues and needs Stropnicky presented
mimicked those typically associate with the clients who Nathanson chose
to dedicate her practice to, she declined to represent him, admittedly, solely
because he was male.224
Stropnicky filed a complaint alleging a violation of the state anti‒
discrimination statute which prohibited discrimination on the basis of
gender in any place of public accommodation.225 A hearing commissioner
found in favor of Stropnicky, determining that Nathanson’s practice of
excluding men from her divorce practice violated the anti-discrimination

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See The Lawyer’s License to Discriminate Revoked, supra note 47, at 216.
Stropnicky, 1999 WL 33453078, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7 n.1.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *7 n.6.
Id.
See id. at *7 n.1.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. (citing MGL 272 § 98).
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statute.
The court ordered Nathanson to cease and desist this
discriminatory practice and ordered her to pay emotional distress
damages.226 This order was affirmed both on review by the full
commission and on appeal to the state superior court.227
While most states and the federal civil rights statutes have yet to address
the issue of whether a law office is a place of public accommodation, a
usual prerequisite for seeking protection under anti-discrimination
legislation, the issue was directly addressed in Nathanson.228 Here, using
the ADA for support, the court found the law firm was a place of public
accommodation as defined in the state anti-discrimination statute.229 The
duty attorneys owe to the public and to the administration of justice further
supported this finding because “attorneys are licensed by the state, are
trained to bring claims that protect the individual as well as the public’s
rights, and are considered ‘officer[s] of the legal system.’”230
Basic ethical considerations also supported the commissioner’s findings.
Nathanson claimed that the commission lacked jurisdiction because only
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Board of Bar Overseers
had jurisdiction to hear claims of attorney misconduct.231 Turning this
argument around, the superior court held that in fact the ethical rules
require that attorneys uphold the law and a finding of unlawful conduct by
a tribunal other than through bar disciplinary proceedings was nothing
new.232
Relying on ethical rules to further argue against the commission’s
jurisdiction, Nathanson claimed that her ethical obligation to zealously
represent her female clients precluded her ability to zealously represent
men. She claimed the commission could not force her to act against her
ethical obligations.233 The court dismissed this argument comparing it to
the absurdity of “an attorney with white supremacist views arguing that he
or she may decline nonwhite clients because such a commitment to white
supremacy would be undermined.234 Citing both the ethical duty to
maintain the integrity of the legal system and to refrain from taking any
action that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, the commission

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id. at *7 n.7.
Id. at *1, 7.
Id. at *7 (referring to the Federal Court’s affirming judgment).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *2.
Id.
See id.
Id. at *7 n.5.
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reasoned that the duty to zealously represent a client could not justify
illegal activity.235
Nathanson also challenged the commission’s findings by claiming
freedom of association and freedom of speech protections.236 In rejecting
the freedom of association claims, the court found that no “intimate
relationship” triggering protection is created when selecting or rejecting
clients based simply upon their gender.237 In addition, applying the antidiscrimination statute to prohibit discrimination in the client selection
process did not preclude other avenues of expressible association.238
Nathanson was free to express her views outside of the attorney-client
relationship.239
Nathanson’s free speech claims were likewise dismissed. The court
questioned whether Nathanson’s rejection of male clients based on gender
and not based on a message would even trigger freedom of speech
protections.240 First, Nathanson, as an attorney, was acting more as a
“conduit for speech” rather than as the speaker.241 In addition, the state
anti-discrimination statute targets the act of discrimination not speech.242
Even if the practice was found to trigger freedom of speech protections, the
state satisfied its burden by showing a compelling state interest supported
the regulation. The state’s need to abate gender discrimination provided
this interest: “The Commonwealth’s compelling interest in abating gender
discrimination outweighs Nathanson’s constitutionally protected right to
free speech in her capacity as a private attorney.”243
Once the “public accommodation” hurdle was cleared, a domino effect
occurred. Nathanson’s pleas for autonomy in the client selection process
did not justify admitted discrimination based on gender.244 Once the
actions were seen as unlawful, no claims of freedom of speech protections
could be successful.245 This case, however, exemplifies a unique situation
that subjected the practice to scrutiny. First, a member of the client pool

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. (stating that a private attorney, when representing a client, operates more as
a conduit for the speech and expression of the client, rather than as a speaker herself).
242. Id. at *6.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. Id. at *7.
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who the attorney sought to exclude actually sought the services of the
attorney who admittedly did not want to represent him; secondly, the state
found that law firms are places of public accommodation thus triggering
the applicability of the state anti-discrimination statute. Absent a
complaining client and the applicability of federal and state antidiscrimination laws, however, the legality of discrimination in the client
selection process will remain unchallenged.
D. “Men Only” Law Firms Fly Under the Radar
“Men Only” law firms remain unchallenged because ethical complaints
and actions under state anti-discrimination statutes are typically initiated by
a specific individual harmed by the discriminatory conduct. Because the
message of “Men Only” is sent prior to establishing a status of even a
“prospective client,”246 it is unlikely that a female will seek representation
by the messenger. The fact that few potential clients will seek out
attorneys who patently do not want to represent them allows the continued
acquiescence to this practice.247
Even if challenged, little recourse is available. Under the ethical rules,
the practice will not be viewed as attorney misconduct unless the
jurisdiction has adopted a version of Rule 8.4 that is broad enough to reach
attorney conduct before the attorney-client relationship is established.248
Even then, unless the conduct is found to be unlawful, Rule 8.4 will not
apply in most jurisdictions. Should a woman call a law office to schedule
an appointment and is refused; only then is a Nathanson situation created.
The woman, at that point, can bring an action under the state antidiscrimination law.249 Here, the claim will only proceed if the statute in
that jurisdiction has a broad enough scope to cover attorney conduct
outside client representation, and if the statute explicitly or implicitly
includes a law firm as a place of public accommodation.250 Even if these
battles are won, the woman must successfully maneuver her way through
the substantive law associated with her discrimination claim against a
lawyer.251
246.
247.
248.
249.

See Firm Profile, supra note 3.
Begg, supra note 47, at 219.
See supra notes 155-173.
See Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law
School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1996-97 (2003).
250. Debra S. Katz & Richard Koffman, Ethical Issues in Employment Law
Practice: Discrimination in Client Selection-Can Attorneys Lawfully Reject Certain
Classes of Clients?, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 1017, 1022
(A.L.I. 1998).
251. See id. at 1022-24.
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The practice also evades challenge by the bar based on the local
attorney-advertising rules because unless the practice is found to be
“unlawful” or “misleading,” this form of commercial speech places the
burden on the state to show that regulating or prohibiting the practice meets
the three-part Central Hudson test.252 Without private complainants or
public outcry, such an intense analysis is unlikely.
The state bars could, and should, examine the impact this type of
message has both on the system and the public and find that this type of
advertising is misleading.253 As reasoned in Pape, advertising that
promotes misleading and manipulative stereotypical images254 associated
with the system interferes with an attorney’s obligation to preserve the
integrity of the legal system and to promote public trust and confidence in
the system.255 The “Men Only” practice not only sends a message that
appears to condone discrimination on the basis of gender, it lacks moral,
ethical, and public policy justification.
III. EXCLUDING WOMEN FROM THE POTENTIAL CLIENT POOL
At this point, the analysis of gender specific client selection divides with
the focus being on the exclusion of women. While the practice of an
assertive exclusion of clients based on gender, or any other protected
classification, raises ethical concerns, the practice of offering services only
to men and excluding women in divorce actions implicates serious
systemic and public harms.256 The continued silence by the bar appears to
indicate public policy justifying its existence: the system treats men
unfairly and the need to protect men’s rights outweighs the impact such
discriminatory practices can have on the administration of justice and the
duty or preserve public confidence in the judicial system.257 This argument
is flawed for two reasons. First, despite decades of reform in the family
law system, women continue to be at a disadvantage to men in divorce

252. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
253. See Florida Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 246-47 (Fla. 2005).
254. Id. at 246.
255. Id. at 244.
256. Kellie A. Cameron Baker, Letters, Legal Discrimination?, THE FLORIDA BAR
NEWS
(Oct.
1,
2013),
https://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/Articles/E888FC1B0BA5BF7
785257BEF004411EB.
257. See Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *5 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003) (holding any freedom of speech claims must give way to the
compelling state interest to abate gender discrimination).
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actions.258 Second, the practice, being void of the need to protect the
individual needs of men, harms all involved in the system and reinforces
the stereotypical, inaccurate, and negative public opinion of the needs of
families in crisis and the legal profession.
A. Increased Women’s Equality Leads to Reform
The efforts to create gender neutrally in the family court system have led
to more inequality than equality in the administration of justice.259 This
inequality is on the female side. Successes in the feminist movement, state
anti-discrimination laws, and advances in female reproductive autonomy
have resulted in increased economic opportunities for women.260 The
women’s movement advocated for equality as a means to insure financial
independence for women.261 Women are now empowered to work outside
of the home full-time, are less financially dependent on their husbands
during the marriage, and have less financial need upon divorce.
Women, having won the public opinion battle for more equality in the
work force, are expected to concede to the outcry of equal rights for men in
divorce.262 The increased income equality between women and men has
impacted the family court system. For example, men’s rights groups now
seek to limit post‒marriage financial obligations and to increase the
parenting time granted to men.263 The state’s view that women now have
the educational and occupational opportunity to earn more income, and
therefore need to rely less on their husband’s financial support during and
after marriage, has led to widespread reform of state alimony laws.264
Today, most states have abolished permanent alimony awards with several
states recognizing only short term or rehabilitative alimony after divorce.265
With the opportunity for both parents to work fulltime outside the home
during the marriage, equality in household management and child care
would presumably follow.266 This assumption supports the efforts of
fathers’ rights groups fighting for parenting time equality.267 Today, most
258. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the
Law Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV.. J. L. & GENDER 1, 22 (2008).
259. See id. at 12.
260. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (2013).
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1202.
263. Id. at 1203.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 18.
267. Id. at 18.
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states’ child care laws have gender neutral language and states have done
away with language that furthers traditional views of parental roles postdivorce.268 For example, the terms “custody” and “visitation” are seldom
found in laws governing parenting.269 Traditional parenting roles are no
longer used to support traditional child development theories.270 The
“tender years” doctrine, which recognized the child’s need to remain in the
custody of the primary care giver, typically and traditionally the mother,
after divorce no longer supports a mother’s claims for primary parenting
responsibilities post-marriage.271 Although the case-by-case and highly
discretionary “best interest” standard continues to be used for establishing
childcare responsibility, gender neutral language and changing views
regarding parental responsibility means a court will no longer necessarily
apply the presumption of the mother-as-caretaker in custody
determinations.272 Rather, in some cases, courts will now presume that the
“best interest” is joint-custody.273
Perceptions of equality also impacted child support determinations. The
combination of a mother’s increased earning capacity and with fathers
being awarded more, or equal, parenting time with the children, ordering
the father to pay guideline child support appeared inequitable.274 Shared
parenting arrangements post‒divorce opened the door to child support
orders that, using the same calculations often criticized by men in the past
to lead to unfair results, were more likely to limit or even eliminate child
support obligations.275
These perceptions of equality appear to justify “Men Only” law firms;
men need assurance that they will be treated fairly in light of women’s
increased financial equality and men’s increased care-taking
responsibilities.276
B. Women’s needs in the age of reform
The reality is that a woman’s role in marriage and her needs in divorce
differ significantly than those portrayed by public opinion and legislative
reform. Today, despite strides toward equality outside the home, women

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See Carbone, supra note 260, at 1200.
See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 248, at 19.
See id. at 19-20.
See id. at 26.
See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 18.
Id. at 18.
Carbone, supra note 260, at 1203‒04.
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 54-55.
See About Drizis, supra note 4.
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still earn less than men277 and they remain at a financial and emotional
disadvantage in divorce.278
The typical family is still comprised of a married couple and their
children.279 Over seventy percent of marriages produce children.280 In
1970, over forty percent of children were being raised by stay-at-home
mothers as compared to twenty percent in 2012.281 Despite the increase of
women in the work force however, women are still more likely than men to
be the primary care‒taker in the family.282 In addition, recent trends show
that over the past decade, the percentage of stay-at-home-mothers has
actually increased to twenty-nine percent.283 Therefore, more women are
foregoing opportunities in the workforce to take on a full-time caretaking
role. Even in families with mothers who work outside the home, it is the
mother “in the vast majority of cases” that “modifies her potential for
income in the workplace in order to care for the children.”284 Because
mothers still typically remain the primary caretaker of the children, they
work fewer hours. And, when mothers work outside the home, their
caretaking responsibilities may well be “outsourced” rather than shared.285
The result is that during marriage, mothers work fewer hours for less
money than fathers.286 This arrangement may serve family needs during
the marriage, however, when divorce is a reality, women find themselves in
a system built on the altruistic ideal of gender neutrality when their needs
are far from equal.
Gender-neutral divorce laws, although meant to advance equality,
actually widened the gap between the genders because they are based on
notions that “idealize the male norm.”287 In the current system, traits
associated with male occupations such as full-time work and long hours are
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Spaulding, supra note 36, at 266.
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 22.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Greg Toppo, More Women Staying Home With Young Kids, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/08/women-stay-at-homemothers-work/7468163/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
282. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 6.
283. Toppo, supra note 281 (stating that the percentage of mothers of children
under age eighteen who do not work outside the home reached an all-time low of
twenty-three percent in 1999, and has since increased back up to twenty-nine percent).
284. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 2.
285. Id. at 10 (referring to Herma Hill Kay’s market-work/caretaking structure that
equates daycare to the “outsourcing” of the female role).
286. See id. at 46-47.
287. Id. at 9.
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given significant weight in property distribution and support awards.288
While the husband is given credit for his hard work outside the home, the
woman may be criticized for a lack of enthusiasm about the opportunities
that await her in the workforce.289 In some situations, the wife’s decision to
work fewer hours for less pay during the marriage can be seen as voluntary
decision to remain underemployed.290 In such circumstances, income,
calculated based upon the male ideal of working capacity and income, can
be imputed to the wife.291
Gender bias remains in parenting determinations as well. Within the
discretionary “best interest” standard, considerations continue to focus on
traits such financial stability and earning power as well as those associated
with past and future primary caretaking abilities.292 The often-superior
occupational or professional financial position of the father is credited
toward the father’s economic stability, while the time away from the
children necessitated by perusing the mother’s occupational or financial
opportunities may be negatively considered when assessing the mother’s
caretaking abilities.293 Because of this highly discretionary determination
and the associated risks, women are “motivate[d]” to negotiate private
agreements with their spouses outside of court in order to maintain some
control over the outcome.294
Women, however, do not necessarily fare better when they enter into
private settlement agreements. First, gender bias does not disappear in the
settlement process; second, limited court oversight of settlement
agreements provides little protection from an inequitable resolution.295
Most marriages today are dissolved though private agreement and are
reviewed using basic contract principles.296 These basic contract principles
presume equal bargaining power.297 Efforts toward gender neutrality in
family law, however, have been linked to women’s reduced bargaining
power in divorce.298
288. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling
Spousal and Co- Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012).
289. Carbone, supra note 260, at 1203.
290. Id.
291. See Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need
Equality? 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 315 (1998).
292. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 258, at 19-20.
293. Id.
294. See id. at 22.
295. Id. at 23. 291.
296. Id. at 12-13.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 21.
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Today, it is still more often the woman who is financially dependent on
her spouse.299 Perceptions of equality, again, detrimentally impact women.
This is supported by the finding that although the wife is more likely to file
for divorce, women are also more likely to bargain against their own
financial stability, and to give away more than they may be awarded
through a judicial determination, in order to preserve their parenting and
childcare roles.300 Further, although the number of men seeking joint
custody has increased, so too has there been an increase in the number of
men who conceded to reduced custody in return for reduced financial
support obligations.301 Support and parenting obligations are subject to
judicial review, but in the age of no fault divorce and notions of equality,
judges are reluctant to interfere with parties resolving the issues
privately.302 The lack of meaningful judicial review allows inequitable
results to remain undiscovered.303
It is therefore not men who experience such a level of injustice in the
system that a systemic acquiescence to a discriminatory practice is
justified. Men continue to fare better than women in the process. Despite
criticism of the percentages reported,304 there is consensus that divorce is
financially devastating for the women who assume the role of caretaker in
the marriage.
Although family court practices have become somewhat more just over
the past twenty years, women still tend to suffer a substantial decrease in
standard of living after divorce. Estimates of the decrease range from
fifteen to twenty-seven percent.305 Alimony awards are rare and, when
offered, are often inadequate. Most scholars agree “divorce under the new
divorce laws has been economically devastating for many women and
children.”306
The effects of this economic devastation extend well beyond the
individual spouses. The 2010 Census reported that 40% of households
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 22.
See id. at 21.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 23.
See Mary Ziegler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of
Marital-Property Reform, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 264 (2013) (citing LENORE
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 274-275 (1987)) (reporting
that women experienced a 73% decline in standard of living one year after divorce
while men enjoyed a 42% increase in standard of living).
305. Id. at 264
306. Id.
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headed by women live in poverty.307 The societal costs associated with this
reality cannot and should not be ignored or furthered by the legal
profession. It is up to the legal profession to close the gap.
IV. CLOSING THE GAP
A blatantly discriminatory practice remains relatively unchallenged
because of a gap in timing. Women are excluded before they even request
the attorney’s services preempting individual standing to challenge the
practice. The result is silence. Ironically, in a system founded on notions
of fairness, the silence allows attorneys to cloak self-centered goals with a
seemingly altruistic, yet unsupported, cause. This gap can be closed,
however, by using the same self-governing principles, which form the
foundation of the legal profession.
From the start, claims for the need for attorney autonomy can be
addressed through application of the basic fairness and justice principles.
If complete autonomy in the client selection process is intact, an attorney is
free to refuse to represent women simply because of their gender.308 A firm
that excludes all women as potential clients in divorce actions simply
because they are women indicates that a firm is comprised of attorneys who
operate under a “thick identity”309 and who choose clients based on “first
order reasons.”310 These attorneys may justify their actions based upon a
client-centered practice but, as demonstrated above, attorneys who choose
clients based on congruence of morals and beliefs or based upon a trait, are
more likely to violate ethical obligations owed to clients.311
Complete autonomy, however, is not, nor has it ever been, the norm.312
Client based representation has been the norm and any analysis of the
appropriateness of refusing to represent women should be analyzed using
this premise.313 While systemic and societal costs of allowing such a

307. See Insecure and Unequal Poverty and Income Among Women and Families,
NATIONAL
WOMEN’S
LAW
CENTER,
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/final_2013_nwlc_povertyreport.pdf (last
visited May 11, 2015).
308. Berenson, supra note 13, at 42.
309. Spaulding, supra note 36, at 18.
310. Id. (stating that these attorneys seek great autonomy in choosing clients and are
guided by their own personal morals or beliefs); see also Wendel, supra note 30, at
1017.
311. See Wendel, supra note 30, at 1000.
312. Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers’ License to Discriminate in New York:
The Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275,
288 (1993) [hereinafter Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative].
313. See Spaulding, supra note 36, at 22.
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practice are great, clearly prohibiting a preemptive exclusion based on
gender will have little negative impact on attorney autonomy in the client
selection process. Once an attorney’s services are requested, the attorney
can rely on traditional gatekeeping rules to decline to represent a client
based on objective or subjective factors, other than gender, that may
interfere with the obligation to competently represent the client.314
Therefore, even under the existing rules, there appears to be little need to
take advantage of the absence of a clear rule prohibiting gender
discrimination when defining the potential client pool. The practice of
excluding all women from the potential client pool, however, takes the
analysis away from the discourse – there is no attorney client
relationship.315 All that remains are the broad systemic goals of justice and
fairness.316 It is therefore up to the profession to further these goals.
The American Bar Association and local organizations can close the gap
by applying the broad concepts of fairness and justice, upon which the
ethical rules are based.317 For entry into the legal profession, good moral
character is required. The practice of excluding all women as potential
clients, despite conflicting data regarding the need to protect men’s rights
in divorce, may well raise “substantial doubts” about the attorney’s
“respect for the rights of others.”318 If our ethical rules recognize the
important role attorneys play in furthering societal order and that attorneys
are an integral part of building and maintaining the public’s confidence in
our judicial system,319 then blatant discrimination in the messages sent to
the public should not be condoned absent strong public policy
considerations.320
Finding that such conduct is unlawful should not need to wait until state
anti-discrimination statutes recognize law firms as places of public
accommodation. The legal profession is founded upon the obligation to
314. Lawyer’s License to Discriminate Revoked, supra note 47, at 209-10 (giving
objective reasons to decline representation, including rule-based reasons such as a
desire not to pursue a frivolous or illegal claim. Subjective reasons include an
attorney’s personal disagreement with a particular cause or issue which will typically
justify a decision to decline representation as long as it is not “a subterfuge for rejecting
a client based on unlawful motives.”).
315. Id. at 211.
316. See id. at 209.
317. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2015), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rul
es_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_16_declining_or_terminating_representation/comm
ent_on_rule_1_16_declining_or_terminating_representation.html.
318. Craddock, supra note 114, at 452-53.
319. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2013).
320. Stonefield, supra note 13, at 115-16.
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accommodate the public.321 It is therefore up to the American Bar
Association, as well as state and local bar associations, to police this
obligation.
The framework for systemic action exists and the action should not wait
until a member of the public complains. The ABA mission statement
specifically includes an obligation to prevent discrimination against women
in the legal system. Included in its stated goals is its objective to “eliminate
bias . . . in the justice system.”322 In addition, in 2012, the American Bar
Association Commission on Women of the Legal Profession was
established not only to address issues related to woman in the legal
profession, but also to address “gender equality issues . . . in society at
large.”323 Further examination by this commission, or by any faction of the
ABA, of the propriety of “Men Only” law firms would be a justifiable task
and the findings could have a system-wide impact.
This examination should include reviewing existing ethical rules for
opportunities to take the lead in clearly prohibiting discrimination in the
practice of law. This can begin with revisiting the comment to Model Rule
8.4 to broaden its application from conduct that occurs in the course of
representing a client to any activity of the attorney in his or her professional
capacity.324 The professional capacity language should include conduct
that affects members of the public, not just clients or potential clients.325
“Men Only” law firms exhibit a facially discriminatory practice.
According to Central Hudson analysis,326 when conduct is facially invalid,
there is no need for further analysis.327 When attorney conduct is facially
discriminatory, it should support a finding that it is unlawful, thus
eliminating the need for a determination under anti-discrimination statutes
and eliminating freedom of speech defenses.328
321. See Elina Tetelbaum, Check Your Identity-Baggage at the Firm Door: The
Ethical Difficulty of Zealous Advocacy in Bias-Ridden Courtrooms 14 TEX. J. C.L. &
C.R. 261, 289 (2009).
322. ABA
Mission
and
Goals,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Feb.
12, 2015).
323. Women
Lawyers,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/diversity/women_lawyers.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2015).
324. See supra notes 142-150.
325. See Lawyer’s License to Discriminate, supra note 47, at 210.
326. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
327. Id. at 563.
328. See Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *5 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).
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Changes in the model rules by the ABA will encourage states and local
bars to adopt changes or clarifications to local rules. The gap will narrow
as a result of the danger of violating a clear, applicable rule. The power
that professional groups, such as the ABA, have in protecting the integrity
of the legal profession should not be underestimated. For example, a
television series depicting a female judge as “unethical, lazy, crude and
hypersexualized” was cancelled partially in response to challenges by
Florida’s Women’s Bar Association that the show disseminated
stereotypical and harmful information to the public.329
Although no similar organizational outcry against gender discrimination
in the client selection process has been found, one “Men Only” billboard
sparked a Florida attorney to question the appropriateness of such a
practice in a profession that is premised on ideals of inclusion:
Being female, I would certainly like the phrase explained to me so that I
am not just presuming that the phrase “men’s rights” and the
discrimination against me is simply an amazing marketing technique that
preys on the stereotype that men will lose everything in a divorce, when
that stereotype is completely contrary to statute and how family law
judges decide cases. Surely a phrase that makes people think that the
courts treat men and women differently in family law cases, coupled
with discrimination against women, cannot be just an effortless way to
330
make a ton of money from men who do not know the law.

V. CONCLUSION
The fact that an attorney’s conduct is not unethical or illegal under
existing rules should not end the analysis of whether it is appropriate and
whether the system should allow it to continue. In a system founded on
justice and fairness, a message sent, and seemingly accepted, by the legal
system that discriminates against women undermines public confidence in
the system. No explicit rules should be necessary to prohibit what is
obviously, at the least, an overgeneralization of a need based on
stereotypical gender roles and a questionable cause. The mere existence of
such a practice, however, indicates a need for clarity. While most ethical
challenges can be resolved within the framework of a claim brought by a
client, a system wide approach is essential when the harm occurs before the
329. Debra Cassens Weiss, “Bad Judge” TV Show is Canceled After Lawyer Group
Protests,
ABA
J.,
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/bad_judge_tv_show_is_canceled_after_lawy
er_group_protests (last updated Nov. 6, 2014).
330. Baker, supra note 256.
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specific rules apply. When looked at from the perspective of the existence
of a “gap” that has allowed the practice to go unchallenged, philosophical
and moral debates can be avoided and the issues can be addressed though a
self-governing approach headed by those involved in the system.
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